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ABSTRACT 
One of the most heated debates of the last two decades in U.S. legal 
academia focuses on customary international law’s domestic status after 
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. At one end, champions of the “modern position” 
support customary international law’s (“CIL”) wholesale incorporation 
into post-Erie federal common law. At the other end, “revisionists” argue 
that federal courts cannot apply CIL as federal law absent federal legislative 
authorization. Scholars on both sides of the Erie debate also make claims 
about the sources judges reference when discerning CIL. They then use these 
claims to support their arguments regarding CIL’s domestic status. 
Interestingly, neither side of the debate has conducted an empirical analysis 
of what U.S. federal courts have actually done. This Article undertakes such 
an analysis and suggests that U.S. federal courts have, for the most part, 
behaved in a manner unanticipated by revisionists and modernists alike—
the courts have followed themselves. After tracking the sources considered 
as evidence of CIL and cited in both pre-Erie and post-Erie case law, it turns 
out that, at all times before and after Erie in 1938, U.S. federal judges have 
relied primarily on domestic case law when making CIL determinations. Put 
starkly, the great Erie debate about CIL determinations in U.S. federal 
courts—and the authority the judiciary ought to attach to certain 
international sources—may have been occurring somewhat orthogonally to 
the fact that U.S. courts do not seem to pay much attention to these sources 
in practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What is customary international law? Is it even “law” to begin with? 
Although both the academic and the international communities have 
recognized customary international law (“CIL”) as one of two main sources 
of international law—the other being treaties—these inquiries persist in the 
minds of those studying CIL.1 One method of answering these questions is 
to ask another—from where does CIL derive its authority? In other words, 
what sources qualify as evidence of CIL such that judges may cite to them 
when discerning CIL norms? 
At first glance, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins2 seems unrelated to CIL. Nevertheless, scholars have latched onto 
Erie’s famous narrative about the death of general common law, and have 
reached sharp disagreement over its effect on CIL’s domestic status in the 
United States. On one side, some scholars support CIL’s wholesale 
incorporation into the “federal common law”3 that the Supreme Court 
 
 1.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (3d ed. 1961) (questioning international law as 
“law” for lacking a sovereign lawmaker); see also Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary is 
Customary International Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 920 (2013) (studying “custom” and 
arguing that “medieval jurists had the same disputes, and the same doubts, about custom that plague 
contemporary lawyers, and they never came to an adequate resolution . . . .”). 
 2.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 3.  See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (holding 
that “whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question 
of ‘federal common law’ upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be 
conclusive”). 
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recognized on the same day that it decided Erie.4 On the other side, some 
argue that federal courts cannot apply CIL as federal law absent federal 
political branch authorization.5 Alternate positions have been advanced since 
the debate intensified in 1997, but all sides recognize the same fundamental 
question—in light of Erie, should U.S. federal courts apply CIL as federal 
law? The question, then, that the Erie debate revolves around involves CIL’s 
status in the United States—something distinct from the question of CIL’s 
sources, generally. 
Nevertheless, scholars within the Erie debate’s main camps have 
advanced their arguments about the “status” question against a backdrop of 
assumptions relating to the “sources” question. As demonstrated below, most 
of these assumptions discuss what counts as evidence of either “state 
practice” or “international consensus.”6 Interestingly, even though these 
assumptions reappear throughout the Erie literature, the Erie debate’s most 
notable participants fail to substantiate these assumptions with empirical 
evidence. The evidence currently available is anecdotal in nature and not 
quantified.7 
To counter this deficit, this Article undertakes such an empirical 
analysis. Rather than taking a position in the classic Erie debate, we hope to 
inform the debate by placing it against the context of federal judicial practice. 
Using a sample of U.S. federal court cases from 1790 to 2015, we document 
the U.S federal judiciary’s methods for arriving at CIL determinations both 
before and after Erie. More specifically, our study tracks the types of sources 
that U.S. federal judges have cited as evidence of CIL and the frequency with 
which they reference them. By observing these trends before and after Erie, 
we test three different narratives detected in the Erie/CIL literature about 
how courts discern CIL: the “state practice” story, the “international 
 
 4.  For examples of this “modern position,” see Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really 
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1841 (1998) (“Far from being novel, the ‘modern position’ is 
actually a long-accepted, traditional reading of the federal courts’ function.”); see also Beth Stephens, 
The Law of our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
393, 397 (1997) (“This article offers a defense of the historical antecedents and current validity of the 
core of the ‘modern position.’”). 
 5.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 870 (1997) (arguing that “in the absence 
of federal political branch authorization, CIL is not a source of federal law”). 
 6.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 7.  For a sophisticated example of this type of anecdotal analysis, see, e.g., Ryan Goodman & 
Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 469 (1997) (supporting the modern position’s inclusion of CIL in federal 
common law, and explaining that “[l]ocating the discussion in actual practice provides salutary conditions 
for evaluating the critique of the modern position. Discussions of federal common law, in particular, are 
better informed by an appreciation of prevailing judicial practices and restraints”). 
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consensus” story, and the “revisionist” story.8 As we explain, our data 
suggest a different story than any of the foregoing three narratives. After 
tracking the sources cited as evidence of CIL over time, it turns out that the 
federal judiciary has relied primarily on domestic case law when making CIL 
determinations both before and after 1938. 
In Part I, we begin by addressing several big picture questions 
underlying our study: namely, how should courts determine CIL? To what 
extent does CIL’s traditional definition influence these determinations? 
What counts as “state practice” versus opinio juris, and does the federal 
judiciary’s reliance on certain sources undermine the process of determining 
CIL? Parts II and III address the narrower context of the Erie debate by 
summarizing Erie’s history and the famous academic saga surrounding the 
CIL “status” question. In Part IV, we introduce the specific focus of our 
empirical work: the varying claims about how courts determined CIL norms 
both before and after Erie. Parts V and VI then explain how we used the 
aforementioned claims to make predictions and the methodology we used to 
test them. Part VII reveals our study’s results, while Part VIII draws out 
implications and concludes. 
The principle aim of this study is to hold those debating Erie 
accountable and invite them to reconcile their theories about the “status” 
issue with the reality of how the “sources” issue has played out in U.S. 
courts. To be clear, we have no quarrel with scholars who support their views 
on CIL’s domestic status with claims about how courts discern CIL’s 
content. This Article simply argues that grounding claims in empirical 
evidence can add substance to the arguments advanced on both sides of the 
Erie debate. Empirical scrutiny also forces an important discussion of 
broader questions regarding CIL’s legitimacy as law. 
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In general, the two main sources of international law are treaties and 
customary international law. The classic definition of CIL comes from the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), which held that legal norms become 
CIL  upon meeting a two-part test: first, the norm must “result from a general 
and consistent practice of states,” and second, states’ adherence to this 
widespread practice must stem “from a sense of legal obligation” known as 
opinio juris.9 
 
 8.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 9.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1 (b), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 
(asserting that the International Court of Justice “shall apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES §102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (explaining that CIL “results from a general and 
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Despite recurring citations to this two-part test in textbooks and 
treatises, some scholars question its accuracy and focus most of their 
critiques on the state practice requirement.10 As J. Patrick Kelly notes, the 
empirical task of finding evidence of widespread state practice seems 
impossible given how many nations exist and how few of them record their 
state practices.11 Moreover, the likelihood of uncovering a consistent pattern 
of practice across a multitude of diverse nations seems slim.12 Others who 
share Kelly’s view add that courts rarely cite to state practice when making 
CIL determinations.13 In fact, recent empirical study reveals that the ICJ has 
consistently ignored its own two-part test over the years and only rarely cites 
to evidence of state practice.14 
Another problem involves the difficulty of determining what qualifies 
as “practice.” Does the term refer exclusively to concrete state acts; or does 
it also encompass “verbal” evidence, including diplomatic correspondence, 
legal opinions, United Nations resolutions, or international committee 
reports?15 A similar challenge involves determining what qualifies as opinio 
juris. Some suggest opinio juris may simply be inferred from state practice, 
or that both CIL requirements—state practice and opinio juris—can be 
inferred from the same “conduct.”16 Others insist the requirements “must be 
assessed separately.”17 Still others claim the international agreements and 
 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”); Michael Akehurst, 
AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44–45 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 7th ed. 
1997) (describing opinio juris as the conviction by states that a norm is required as an international legal 
obligation). 
 10.  See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
449, 472 (2000). 
 11.  See id. (noting that only the “largest and most sophisticated nations collect and publish their 
state practice”); see also Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 767 (2001) (noting that “most customs are 
found to exist on the basis of practice by fewer than a dozen states”). 
 12.  See Kelly, supra note 10, at 453 (claiming that CIL analysis as it is conducted in reality involves 
“little consideration of alternatives and trade-offs in reconciling diverse values and interests”). 
 13.  See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 365, 386 (2002) (citing to Kelly’s work). 
 14.  Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How Do Courts Do It?, in 
CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 117, 137 tbl. 5.1 (Curtis A. Bradley 
ed., 2016) [hereinafter CUSTOM’S FUTURE] (finding that the ICJ, in CIL determinations, cites primarily 
to treaties and rarely to state practice). 
 15.  See Young, supra note 13, at 386 (“Disagreements exist as to what sort of things ought to count 
as practice: Should we only count actual state actions, on the theory that they speak louder than words?”). 
 16.  See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A 
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 175, 182 (2005) (“When there is sufficiently dense practice, an opinio juris is generally 
contained within that practice and, as a result, it is not usually necessary to demonstrate separately the 
existence of an opinio juris.”). 
 17.  John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International 
GUTIERREZ & GULATI - FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2017  3:36 PM 
248 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 27:243 
declarations that scholars often cite to as evidence of state practice are in fact 
more indicative of opinio juris.18 
Kelly concludes that “CIL norms are the deductive conclusions of 
international law writers, judges, and advocates.”19 This statement echoes 
Louis Sohn’s renowned piece, which contends that CIL “is made by the 
people that care; the professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and 
the authors of articles in leading international law journals.”20 Sohn further 
describes how various courts have traditionally “agreed that [international] 
law is made by the practice of states,” while ultimately citing to writers and 
publicists who “collected and crystallized” myriad histories of state 
practice.21 Given that these writers often publish their own unique views 
regarding CIL, it seems that it is not just state practice that they are 
crystallizing. Should this possibility worry CIL scholars? Perhaps not, but 
Kelly remains skeptical of CIL norms and argues that “CIL lacks authority 
as law, because such norms are not, in fact, based on the implied consent or 
general acceptance of the international community that a norm is 
obligatory.”22 Between Kelly and Sohn, broader questions regarding CIL’s 
legitimacy as law appear to flow directly from questions surrounding the 
proper sources and processes for discerning CIL norms—questions that play 
a key role in the Erie debate over CIL. 
II. ERIE RAILROAD V. TOMPKINS 
As Justice Felix Frankfurter aptly stated, Erie “did not merely overrule 
a venerable case. It overruled a particular way of looking at law . . . .”23 The 
venerable case that Justice Frankfurter referenced was Swift v. Tyson, which 
contained the most famous application of the “general common law” that 
U.S. courts developed prior to 1938.24 The general common law was neither 
state nor federal—it was simply “the common law.”25 The independent, 
uniform nature of general common law26 meant that judges “found” rather 
 
Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 443, 446 (describing opinio juris as distinct from state practice). 
 18.  Young, supra note 13, at 386–87. 
 19.  Kelly, supra note 10, at 475. 
 20.  Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 399, 399 (1996). 
 21.  Id. at 401. 
 22.  Kelly, supra note 10, at 452. 
 23.  Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). 
 24.  Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1938). 
 25.  Stephens, supra note 4, at 410 (internal citation omitted) (describing pre-Erie common law). 
 26.  See Swift, 41 U.S. at 19 (asserting, in Latin, that the law cannot be one thing in Rome and 
something else in Athens). 
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than “made” law.27 Nearly a century after Swift, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Erie declared “[t]here is no federal general common law.”28 In 
the process, Justice Louis Brandeis—channeling Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes—held that the common law is not some “august corpus”29 in the sky; 
it is law that judges “make” rather than “find.”30 From Erie’s legal realism 
flowed the positivist idea that judges needed “some definite” lawmaking 
authority from a sovereign source in order to “make” law.31 After Erie, the 
only valid sovereign sources under which federal courts can legitimately 
make law are the Constitution or federal legislation.32 
On the same day it decided Erie, the Supreme Court also decided 
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., holding that, while 
the general common law no longer exists, federal judges may still make 
“federal common law”.33 After Erie, it became clear that this “federal 
common law” governed cases pertaining to uniquely federal interests.34 Over 
time, the Supreme Court carved out “enclaves” of this federal judge-made 
law, upholding it as “genuine federal law that binds the states under the 
Supremacy Clause and potentially establishes Article III and statutory 
‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”35 
 
 27.  See id. at 18 (“In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended, that the decisions 
of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, 
laws.”); see also Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 612 (1938) 
(asserting that a court “does not make the law but merely finds or declares the law, and so its decisions 
simply constitute evidence of what the law is, which another court is free to reject in favor of better 
evidence to be found elsewhere”). 
 28.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 29.  Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 
518, 533 (1928). 
 30.  William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 19, 23 (2007) (noting that “[i]f judges ‘made’ rather than ‘found’ the common law, it followed 
that they needed lawmaking authority. It was this change that led ultimately to Erie”). 
 31.  See id. and accompanying text. But see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance 
of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 674 (1998) (challenging the conventional view that Erie’s 
“constitutional holding relies on a commitment to legal positivism”). 
 32.  See Dodge, supra note 30, at 24 (“Under Erie’s own positivist view . . . authority for the 
additional requirement of incorporation would have to be found in a statute or the Constitution. If it were 
simply the product of judicial lawmaking, it would be illegitimate.”). 
 33.  See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (stating 
that the issue of interstate water apportionment “is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which neither 
the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive”). For an explanation of when federal 
judges apply federal common law, see Koh, supra note 4, at 1830–41. 
 34.  See Tex. Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). 
 35.  Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of 
Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 878 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s references to federal enclaves); 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) (“[T]here are enclaves of federal judge-
made law which bind the States.”). 
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III. THE ERIE DEBATE: A STATUS QUESTION 
On its face, Erie’s story about the death of general common law has 
little to do with CIL’s legal status in the United States. Before Erie, U.S. 
courts regularly applied CIL in a wide variety of contexts.36 Justice Gray 
provided the most famous pre-Erie praise of CIL when he upheld the law of 
nations as “part of our law” in The Paquete Habana.37 However, Justice 
Gray’s assertion begs an important question—in what sense was CIL “part 
of our law” before Erie? Did the answer to this question change after Erie? 
On the surface, the text of the U.S. Constitution leaves these questions 
unanswered, although it mentions that Congress has the power to “define and 
punish . . . offenses against the law of nations.”38 
Philip Jessup, a Columbia Law professor who later became a judge for 
the ICJ, became one of the first to tackle these questions in 1939.39 In his 
famous piece, Jessup concluded that “any attempt to extend the [Erie 
doctrine] to international law should be repudiated by the Supreme Court.”40 
He noted that “applying international law in our courts involves the foreign 
relations of the United States and can thus be brought within a federal 
power.”41 Therefore, he reasoned, it “would be as unsound as it would be 
unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the 
rules of international law.”42 Since Jessup’s writings, other scholars have 
taken on the Erie narrative and engaged in ferocious disagreements about its 
effect on the application of CIL in U.S. Courts. Despite myriad opinions, the 
debate concerning CIL’s domestic status and Erie revolves around two main 
camps—the “modern position” and “revisionism.” 
In its most extreme form, the modern position supports the automatic, 
wholesale incorporation of CIL into federal common law after Erie.43 In 
other words, federal judges can “make” CIL using the authority to create 
 
 36.  See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (No. 6360) (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (“The law of nations 
as well as the law of nature is of ‘origin divine.’”); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133, 144 (1795) (applying 
the law of nations to a prize case); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 153 (1820) (adopting the definition 
of “piracy” under the law of nations); Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1893) (applying the thalweg rule 
to a state boundary case). 
 37.  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 38.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 39.  Jeremy Rabkin, Off the Track or Just Down the Line? From Erie Railroad to Global 
Governance, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 251, 254 (2013) (describing Jessup’s role in the Erie debate). 
 40.  Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 
AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense about Customary International Law: A 
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 376 n.31 (1997) (“I would be 
content to label the incorporated [CIL] rules as rules of federal common law.”). 
GUTIERREZ & GULATI - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2017  3:36 PM 
2017] CUSTOM IN OUR COURTS 251 
common law that they retained after Hinderlider.44 This CIL will have the 
force of federal law that both establishes Article III jurisdiction and preempts 
inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.45 
The modern camp does not deny CIL’s pre-Erie status as general common 
law.46 However, a key premise of the modern position is that CIL has always 
had the status of federal law insofar that it governs foreign relations—an area 
of distinctly “federal interest”—since the time of our forefathers.47 Some 
adherents to the modern position point to Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of 
the Constitution, and to certain federal statutes,48 as “explicit grant[s] of 
authority” for federal courts “to define and fashion federal rules with regard 
to the law of nations . . . .”49 If CIL has always been part of U.S. federal law, 
then—as Justice Harlan suggested in Paquete Habana—federal judges 
applying CIL post-Erie are simply exercising legitimate authority that they 
never lost.50 In other words, CIL does not require extra domestic 
authorization before judges can incorporate it into post-Erie federal common 
law because CIL never constituted “unauthorized” general common law to 
 
 44.  See Koh, supra note 4, at 1832 (“It was precisely to preserve the federal common lawmaking 
power of the federal courts in such areas that Justice Brandeis acknowledged [in Hinderlider] that federal 
judges may continue to make specialized federal common law regarding issues of uniquely federal 
concern.”). 
 45.  See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 43, at 383 (claiming that “the modern position entails the 
conclusion that, in the face of congressional silence, [CIL] will be supreme over the laws of the States”); 
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561, 1559–60 
(1984) (asserting that CIL has “the status of federal law for purposes of supremacy to state law” and that 
“there is now general agreement” that international law cases “are within the judicial power . . . under 
[A]rticle III”); Stephens, supra note 4, at 397 (arguing that a CIL issue “is a federal question, which 
triggers federal court jurisdiction and on which federal court decisions are binding on the states”). 
 46.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2354 
(1991) [hereinafter Transnational] (“[T]hroughout the early nineteenth century, American courts 
regularly construed and applied the unwritten law of nations as part of the ‘general common law,’ . . . 
without regard to whether it should be characterized as federal or state.”); Henkin, supra note 45, at 1557–
58 (describing the Swift era and how “the question whether international law was state law or federal law 
was not an issue: it was ‘the common law’”). 
 47.  See Stephens, supra note 4, at 443 (arguing that the framers of the Constitution intended for the 
federal government to enforce the “law of nations” as it governed foreign affairs, and that pre-Erie 
international law cases applied a “precursor” of federal common law); see also Koh, supra note 4, at 1841 
(“[T]he so-called ‘modern position’ extends at least as far back as Alexander Hamilton. Far from being 
novel, the ‘modern position’ is actually a long-accepted, traditional reading of the federal courts’ 
function.”); Neuman, supra note 43, at 392 (upholding the modern position as a “200-year-old practice 
of judicially incorporating [CIL]”). 
 48.  See Koh, supra note 4, at 1835 n.60 (citing the ATS and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
as “expressly delegat[ing] to the federal courts authority to derive federal common law rules from 
established norms of [CIL]”). 
 49.  Id. at 1835. 
 50.  See id. at 1841 (“Both before and after Erie, the federal courts issued rulings construing the law 
of nations. Erie never intended to alter or disrupt that practice, which has continued as the ‘new’ federal 
common law.”). 
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begin with.51 In fact, some modernists argue that CIL already has “definite 
authority behind it” because it has historically been grounded in state 
practice.52 
The modern position became the mainstream academic view in the 
decades immediately following the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.53 However, the academic establishment was 
thrown into disarray in 1997 when two enfants terribles, Curtis Bradley and 
Jack Goldsmith, introduced the definitive manifesto for “revisionism.”54 
Revisionists begin with the “uncontroversial” premise that pre-Erie CIL had 
the status of general common law.55 After Erie, they contend, federal courts 
cannot apply CIL as federal law without domestic, positive incorporation 
from the federal branches—either through the Constitution or a federal 
statute.56 In their vigorous attack on the modern position, Bradley and 
Goldsmith conclude that “CIL should not have the status of federal common 
law” and assert that any arguments favoring CIL’s automatic incorporation 
into federal common law “depart from well-accepted notions of American 
representative democracy, federal common law, separation of powers, and 
federalism.”57 
Proponents of the modern position responded by launching equally 
pointed attacks on the 1997 article shortly after its publication.58 The ensuing 
debate intensified to the point that José Alvarez, in a 2007 Presidential 
Address before the American Society of International Law, referred to 
Bradley and Goldsmith as among the “Four Horsemen of the Constitutional 
 
 51.  See Dodge, supra note 30,at 21–25 (arguing that the “original understanding” of Erie permits 
federal courts to apply CIL without the revisionists’ “additional requirement” of “positive authority for 
the incorporation” of CIL into U.S. law, and this is so because of CIL’s positivist foundation). 
 52.  See id. at 23–24 (“[B]y 1938, [CIL] already rested on a positivist foundation of state practice 
and consent. [CIL] did have ‘some definite authority behind it’—the consent of nations reflected in their 
practice.”). 
 53.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 54.  For the article that set off the firestorm, see generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5; see 
also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights 
Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 320 (1997) (“[T]he legitimacy of human rights litigation is what is 
really at stake in debates over the modern position.”). For earlier versions of the revisionist stance, see 
generally A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 
(1995) (criticizing the “federalizing” of CIL in international cases brought before US courts); Phillip R. 
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986) (arguing that 
US courts had been applying CIL in a way that was irreconcilable with American political tradition). 
 55.  Bradley et al., supra note 35, at 882. 
 56.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 870 (arguing that “in the absence of federal political 
branch authorization, CIL is not a source of federal law”). 
 57.  Id. at 821. 
 58.  See generally, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7; Koh, supra note 4; Stephens, supra note 
4; Neuman, supra note 43. 
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apocalypse.”59 Peter Spiro—another prominent legal academic—considered 
Bradley and Goldsmith’s piece the source of a “New Sovereigntist” 
movement that promoted an anti-international form of American 
exceptionalism.60 Tension between the competing sides in the Erie debate 
has continued unabated, with several others joining in the discussion and 
contributing alternative perspectives regarding CIL’s post-Erie domestic 
status.61 
Nearly all parties to the Erie debate ground their arguments in the same 
historical narrative—that the Supreme Court did not directly address CIL’s 
post-Erie status until 1964 when it decided Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino.62 Sabbatino held that the act of state doctrine63 was a rule of 
federal common law, binding on the states and flowing from the federal 
government’s authority over foreign relations issues.64 In holding that the 
doctrine was immune from Erie, the Court cited Jessup and found that he 
correctly “recognized the potential dangers were Erie extended to legal 
problems affecting international relations.”65 
Although supporters of the modern position initially considered 
Sabbatino a “setback” for the application of CIL in U.S. courts,66 they 
eventually adopted the Court’s analysis as a basis for arguing that the 
Supreme Court had incorporated CIL into federal common law.67 In 
 
 59.  José E. Alvarez, The Future of Our Society, 102 ASIL 499, 503 (2008). The other two 
horsemen, according to Alvarez, were John Yoo of UC Berkeley and Ernest Young of Duke University. 
 60.  Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and its False Prophets, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 2000), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2000-11-
01/new-sovereigntists-american-exceptionalism-and-its-false-prophets [https://perma.cc/N4VG-66Z6]. 
 61.  See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 555, 577 (2002) (arguing that courts should treat CIL as a form of non-preemptive federal law); see 
generally Young, supra note 13 (advancing “an intermediate solution” of treating CIL as “general” law—
a category of law that is neither state nor federal, that would not preempt contrary state policies, and that 
both state and federal courts may apply in accordance with traditional conflict of laws principles). 
 62.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). But see Bradley & Goldsmith, 
supra note 5, at 836 (asserting, contrary to the majority of parties to the Erie debate, that Sabbatino did 
not address CIL’s domestic legal status). 
 63.  Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (The act of state doctrine refers to the rule 
that every sovereign state “is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the 
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its 
own territory”). 
 64.  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425–27. 
 65.  Id. at 425 (citing to Jessup, supra note 40) (“It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have 
rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.”). 
 66.  See Transnational, supra note 46, at 2363 (suggesting that Sabbatino “cast a profound chill 
upon the willingness of [U.S.] courts to interpret or articulate norms of international law . . . ”); John R. 
Stevenson, The State Department and Sabbatino—“Ev’n Victors are by Victories Undone,” 58 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 707, 708 (1964) (expressing “dismay” with the Sabbatino opinion). 
 67.  See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of “Chinese 
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response, Bradley and Goldsmith point out that “Sabbatino clearly indicated 
that the act of state doctrine was neither required by nor an element of CIL,” 
and, therefore, “the Court’s statement that the act of state doctrine is a federal 
common law rule does not extend to questions of CIL.”68 
The literature identifies the 1980’s—a critical period for the rise of 
international human rights litigation in the U.S.—as the next phase of the 
Erie saga.69 Many human rights lawsuits arose under the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”), which grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States.”70 In 1984, the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala issued the first decision approving application of the ATS in 
international human rights litigation.71 Finding that torture by public officials 
“violates . . . the law of nations,”72 the court in Filartiga upheld Article III 
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim on the basis that it arose under the 
ATS.73 In reaching its conclusion, the court asserted that CIL “has always 
been part of the federal common law.”74 
Despite Filartiga’s apparent embrace of the modern position, 
revisionists claim the decision does not provide reliable support for CIL’s 
status as federal common law because the Second Circuit “relied uncritically 
on pre-Erie precedents” that “applied CIL as general common law, not 
federal common law.”75 Revisionists also emphasize that the Filartiga court 
was merely a circuit court that, like other lower courts, focused only on using 
CIL’s status as federal law to ensure jurisdiction.76 Recent discussions about 
Erie and CIL continue to focus on ATS litigation with particular attention to 
the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.77 In Sosa, 
 
Exclusion” and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 876 (1987) (“The Supreme Court, however, 
eliminated th[e] historic confusion of international with common law when it recognized in 1964 that 
international law is not state but federal law.”); Koh, supra note 4, at 1833 (arguing that rather than 
“shy[ing] away from interpreting questions of [CIL],” the Sabbatino Court “construed [CIL] to determine 
that international law neither compelled nor required application of the act of state doctrine”). 
 68.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 859 n.284 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421). 
 69.  See, e.g., id. at 831–34 (dedicating an entire section of the piece to Filartiga’s effect on post-
Erie CIL). 
 70.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 71.  See generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (reviewing Paraguayan 
citizens’ suit for acts of torture committed in Paraguay). 
 72.  Id. at 880. 
 73.  Id. at 887. 
 74.  Id. at 885. 
 75.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 834. 
 76.  See id. at 831 (noting the “jurisdictional context of Filartiga”). 
 77.  See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (reviewing one Mexican 
national’s claim against another for violating CIL’s prohibition on arbitrary arrest). 
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the Court looked to the ATS’s legislative history and characterized it as a 
strictly jurisdictional statute.78 Simultaneously, the Court held that after Erie, 
the ATS authorizes judges to create new causes of action for a narrow set of 
CIL violations as a matter of federal common law.79 Unsurprisingly, the 
modern position’s supporters considered Sosa a ringing endorsement by the 
Supreme Court of CIL as federal common law in ATS cases.80 In contrast, 
revisionists claim that Sosa is “best read as rejecting that position.”81 At this 
rate, it will likely take more than the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa to 
resolve the Erie debate. 
IV. CIL AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL PRACTICE: A SOURCES 
QUESTION 
When contrasting the responses of both the modern position and the 
revisionists to the “sources” question, we found it helpful to consider CIL in 
terms of its pre- and post-Erie forms. Along the way, we developed 
predictions about what we would uncover if we tracked the sources to which 
U.S. federal courts have cited as evidence of CIL across several centuries. 
Our predictions revolve around three narratives discerned in the Erie/CIL 
literature—two from the modern camp and one from the revisionist camp. 
For ease of reference, we refer to these narratives as the “state practice” 
story, the “international consensus” story, and the “revisionist” story. 
A. Customary International Law in U.S. Courts: 1700–1937 
The academic community agrees that pre-Erie courts treated CIL as 
general common law.82 Academicians also agree that pre-1938 courts 
recognized the general common law as originating from natural law 
 
 78.  Id. at 724. 
 79.  Id. at 729–33. 
 80.  See William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System 
After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87, 95–96 (2004) (arguing that the Sosa 
majority had rejected many of Bradley’s, Goldsmith’s, and Justice Scalia’s revisionist premises); see also 
Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
97, 104 n.27 (2004) (stating that Sosa “settled part of [the Erie] debate, recognizing that some CIL is 
federal common law”). 
 81.  See Bradley et al., supra note 35, at 870 (granting that there are “a number of contexts in 
addition to the ATS in which it is appropriate for courts to develop federal common law by reference to 
CIL” after Sosa). 
 82.  See sources cited supra note 46; see also Bradley et al., supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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principles83 and from British common law.84 Unsurprisingly, U.S. courts by 
the late-eighteenth century also regarded CIL as a byproduct of natural law 
and of English common law.85 Throughout this era, writers such as Hugo 
Grotius, Emmerich de Vattel, and William Blackstone laid the foundation of 
international law upon natural law principles.86 
That said, even de Vattel developed a theory of “voluntary” or 
“positive” CIL—CIL based on the actual practices of states.87 In fact, the 
conventional academic narrative is that CIL developed a positivist streak by 
the end of the nineteenth century.88 This positivism appeared through the 
language of state practice, which courts often labeled the “common consent 
of states” or the “usages of civilized nations.”89 Today, academics invoke 
famous cases such as The Paquete Habana, The Antelope, and The Scotia as 
illustrations of the positivist CIL trend in the pre-Erie days.90 
 
 83.  See Dodge, supra note 30, at 22–23 (discussing the natural law basis for eighteenth century 
common law and explaining how the common law later shifted toward positivism because of Erie); 
George Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 10 CONST. 
COMMENT. 285, 285 (1993) (describing general common law as “a form of natural law”); Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., Varieties and Complexities of Doctrinal Change: Historical Commentary, 1901-1945, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 285, 289–90 (David L. 
Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey, and William S. Dodge eds., 2011) (describing the “general” law as law based 
on principles of “reason and morality”). 
 84.  See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 22 (1842) (citing to English court decisions and concluding that 
“[i]n the American Courts, so far as we have been able to trace the [decisions], the same doctrine seems 
generally, but not universally, to prevail”). 
 85.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 822–23 (citing to The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 
253, 297 (1814); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815); Talbot v. 
Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1795) (Iredell, J.); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 
(1820)). 
 86.  See David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the Supreme 
Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra 
note 83, at 7, 8 (specifying de Vattel’s The Law of Nations and Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws 
of England as “[t]wo works in particular [that] framed the early American view of the law of nations”); 
see also Sohn, supra note 20, at 399 (referring to Grotius and de Vattel as two of the “fathers of 
international law”). 
 87.  EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS lxv–lxvi (Joseph Chitty 
trans., 7th ed. 1849). 
 88.  See David J. Bederman, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 1861-1900, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 83, at 89, 99 
(describing the Court’s “decisive shift to a positivist footing for customary international law norms”); see 
also Neuman, supra note 43, at 373, 373 n.12 (stating that “positivist jurisprudence superseded naturalist 
jurisprudence as the prevailing approach to international law” during the nineteenth century, and that “[i]t 
would therefore be a mistake to associate the pre-Erie regime with a naturalist approach to international 
law”). 
 89.  See Bederman, supra note 88, at 95 (citing to Hilton v. Guyot and to the Prize Cases for 
common consent); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 838–39 (asserting that the “traditional” CIL 
that prevailed before World War II was more closely tied to state practice). 
 90.  See, e.g., Sloss et al., supra note 86, at 36; Bederman, supra note 88, at 97, 99, 109. 
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We should note, however, that some scholars who discerned this 
positivist trend also assert that the U.S. Supreme Court merely paid lip 
service to CIL’s basis in state practice and rarely cited to concrete, empirical 
evidence of such practice.91 Others assert that the positivism of The Paquete 
Habana faded in the early-twentieth century, as CIL became fused with 
general common law.92 After all, since general common law was “based not 
on state consent and practice but on principles of reason and morality, the 
merger of customary international law into ‘general’ law meant that 
American courts would look to those principles, not to state behavior, to 
determine customary international law’s content.”93 Other scholars note that 
judges were already segueing into a positivistic view of CIL as early as 1820 
with the Antelope case, but that they continued using naturalistic language 
well into the late-nineteenth century.94 
Despite these mixed opinions about courts’ reliance on state practice 
before Erie, academics agree that the centuries preceding Erie comprised the 
golden era of the international treatises and digests.95 To the extent that 
courts cited to state practice, they often delegated the empirical task of 
gathering evidence of such practice to the digest writers of England, France, 
and the United States.96 From the foregoing, we expected that if we tracked 
the sources judges cited to as authority for CIL, the pre-Erie data would yield 
high citation rates to academic sources regardless of whether courts relied on 
these sources for their naturalistic or positivistic content. As for state 
 
 91.  Bederman, supra note 88, at 104 (“Even by the time of such cases as The Scotia and The 
Paquete Habana . . . [and] even as the rhetoric of the Court’s decisions seemed to emphasize [CIL] as 
the empirical product of state practice, the evidence of such norms that the Court chose to cite was often 
not so inductive.”). 
 92.  Michael D. Ramsey, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 1901-1945, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 83, at 225, 
227 (“General common law, as the early-twentieth-century [Supreme] Court applied it, was not heavily 
tied to customary practices; as it gradually subsumed international law, the positivism of The Paquete 
Habana (and its strict link to nations’ practices) also declined.”). 
 93.  Purcell, Jr., supra note 83, at 289–90. 
 94.  Bederman, supra note 88, at 92. 
 95.  See Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge supra note 86, at 8 (“For the content of the law of nations, early 
Americans relied heavily on European treatise writers (‘publicists’), including Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Wolff, and Rutherforth. Of the publicists, they turned most often to [de] 
Vattel.”). For a thorough, early-twentieth century perspective on how publicists shaped the law of nations 
in centuries past, see generally Jesse S. Reeves, The Influence of the Law of Nature upon International 
Law in the United States, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 547 (1909) (describing early academia’s comingling of 
international law with the natural law tradition through the works of Locke, Hooker, Grotius, de Vattel, 
Blackstone, Wilson, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Bynkershoek). 
 96.  For a thorough review of how the pre-Erie publicists shaped CIL determinations, see generally, 
e.g., Edwin D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 
(1932); Harold H. Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in the Federal Courts of 
the United States, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 280 (1932); Sohn, supra note 20, at 400. 
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practice, we decided to test the traditional academic consensus that pre-Erie 
courts cited heavily to actual state practice. 
Of course, if we assume that U.S. courts actually follow the traditional 
definition of CIL, then we should expect high citation rates to actual practice 
in both pre- and post-Erie CIL determinations. In fact, as described below, 
some of the modern position’s scholars from the Erie debate imply that this 
did in fact occur. Here, we uncovered the first narrative tested in our study—
the “state practice” story. 
Under this narrative, international state practice serves as the basis for 
CIL’s pre-Erie and post-Erie legitimacy as federal law. As noted previously, 
Erie injected legal positivism into the making of common law by declaring 
that “law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without 
some definite authority behind it.”97 Thus, some adherents to the modern 
position challenge revisionists’ calls for CIL’s positive incorporation into 
federal law by arguing that CIL has always originated from a positive 
authority—“the consent of nations reflected in their practice.”98 
For example, after citing to The Paquete Habana and The Scotia, 
William S. Dodge asserts that “[b]ecause positive customary international 
law [before Erie] was grounded in state practice and consent, it was not open 
to the same charge of judicial lawmaking as the common law more 
generally.”99 In other words, the fact that federal courts lacked authority to 
make substantive law after Erie does not matter because, by 1938, CIL had 
“some definite authority behind it” in the form of state practice.100 For 
Dodge, CIL’s “positivist foundation” renders superfluous the revisionists’ 
“additional requirement” of “positive authority for the incorporation” of CIL 
into the U.S. legal system.101 
In a famous variation on the modern position, Louis Henkin argued that 
CIL is “like” federal common law insofar as it qualifies as federal law that 
preempts inconsistent state law and establishes federal jurisdiction.102 
Henkin distinguishes CIL from federal common law, however, as something 
judges “find” rather than “create,” and he claims that judges find CIL “by 
examining the practices and attitudes of foreign states.”103 If judicial practice 
indeed reflects Dodge and Henkin’s views, our data should yield high 
 
 97.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer 
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 98.  Dodge, supra note 30, at 24. 
 99.  Id. at 23. 
 100.  Id. at 23–24. 
 101.  Id. at 24. 
 102.  Henkin, supra note 45, at 1561–62. 
 103.  Henkin, supra note 67, at 876. 
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citation rates to variables indicative of state practice, both before and after 
Erie. Such a result would not only vindicate traditional conceptions of CIL, 
but it would also dispel revisionist fears of undemocratic judges concocting 
CIL norms. Neither Dodge nor Henkin explicitly addresses which sources 
count as “practice,” so we limited our test to traditional, uncontroversial 
sources for this narrative, such as concrete acts of states. 
B. Customary International Law in U.S. Courts: 1938–1980 
The decades immediately following Erie presented a special puzzle. As 
far as almost everyone is concerned, the question of Erie’s effect on CIL’s 
domestic status remained unanswered at least until the Sabbatino or 
Filartiga decisions surfaced.104 What, then, occurred during the thirty or 
forty years after Erie? 
Generally, fewer CIL-related cases reached the courts during this era 
for several reasons, including the disappearance of nineteenth century 
subjects of significance to CIL (e.g., piracy) and certain developments in 
constitutional law adjudication.105 Most of the CIL-related cases that 
emerged during this time period were not direct application cases; rather, 
they drew upon CIL norms, but were ultimately governed by the statutes and 
treaties codifying those norms.106 Thus, we predicted that the number of 
citations to treaties and statutes would likely increase, but we did not expect 
dramatic changes in the data between 1938 and 1980. If the literature is 
correct, and if CIL’s domestic legitimacy remained unchallenged until 
Sabbatino or Filartiga, then judicial practices before Erie must have been 
considered legitimate by judges deciding cases before 1964 (Sabbatino), or 
at least before 1980 (Filartiga). 
One particular case, however, presented another possibility. On the 
same day that the Supreme Court decided Erie and Hinderlider, it also 
decided Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. United States.107 In 
Guaranty Trust Company, the primary issue was whether the Russian 
Government could claim sovereign immunity against New York’s statute 
of limitations for a case brought in U.S. federal court.108 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Stone recognized that the ancient principle of quod nullum 
tempus ocurrit regi (“no time runs against the king”) originated under British 
law.109 He concluded, however, that if the principle retained any validity, it 
 
 104.  See supra Part III (“The Erie Debate: A Status Question”). 
 105.  Ramsey, supra note 92, at 226, 235. 
 106.  Id. at 235. 
 107.  Guar. Tr. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938). 
 108.  Id. at 129. 
 109.  Id. at 132 (citing to two British cases for support). 
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stemmed from “its uniform survival in the United States” and from public 
policy rather than from “any inherited notions of the personal privilege of 
the king.”110 Curiously, in declining to apply the rule, the Court’s majority 
cited exclusively to U.S. case law to argue that international law did not 
support the rule’s application.111 
As Michael Ramsey points out, the sole question under Erie “should 
have been whether the New York Courts would apply the limitations 
period—so Stone must have thought that Erie for some reason did not 
apply.”112 Perhaps Justice Stone saw this foreign relations matter as a 
distinctly federal interest where federal common law could displace state 
law.113 Then again, perhaps we are reading too much into the fact that the 
Supreme Court decided Guaranty Trust on the same day that it decided Erie 
and Hinderlider. Ultimately, we predicted that if Guaranty Trust offers an 
accurate indicator of judicial practice, we would uncover more citations to 
domestic case law for CIL during the period from 1938 to 1980. Ultimately, 
however, we anticipated discovering only limited change during this period, 
and we predicted that dramatic shifts in our data would not emerge until 
much later. 
C. Customary International Law in U.S. Courts: 1980–2015 
For many Erie scholars, the period from 1980 to the present represents 
a key chapter in the debate on the “status” of CIL. Many scholars credit the 
Filartiga line of cases and the publication in the 1980s of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States for the federal 
courts’ alleged acceptance of the modern position.114 While examining this 
episode in the Erie saga, we uncovered two more narratives seeking to 
explain how judges discern CIL—the “international consensus” story and 
the “revisionist” story. 
As its label suggests, the “international consensus” story places less 
emphasis on state practice and focuses more generally on “consensus.” Here, 
 
 110.  Id. (“[I]ndependently of the royal prerogative once thought sufficient to justify it, the rule is 
supportable now because its benefit and advantage extend to every citizen . . . and its uniform survival in 
the United States has been generally accounted for and justified on grounds of policy rather than upon 
any inherited notions of the personal privilege of the king.”). 
 111.  See id. at 133 (“Diligent search of counsel has revealed no judicial decision supporting such an 
application of the rule in this or any other country.”). 
 112.  Ramsey, supra note 92, at 250 (emphasis in original). 
 113.  See id. (“Put together with Hinderlider, Pink, Belmont and Curtiss-Wright, one might argue 
that the Court [in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York] had in mind a federal common law displacing States 
in foreign affairs cases (including customary international law cases).”). 
 114.  See Koh, supra note 4. 
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a subgroup of the modern camp rests its philosophy on a particular passage 
from Sabbatino: 
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or 
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more 
appropriate it is for [judges] to render decisions regarding it, since the 
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to 
circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a 
principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international 
justice.115 
After asserting a lack of international consensus with regard to foreign 
expropriations,116 Justice Harlan’s Sabbatino opinion includes a footnote 
explaining that the decision “in no way intimates that the courts of this 
country are broadly foreclosed from considering questions of international 
law” because “[t]here are, of course, areas of international law in which 
consensus as to standards is greater and which do not represent a 
battleground for conflicting ideologies.”117 
In defense of the modern position, Harold Hongju Koh interprets Justice 
Harlan’s language to mean that “[o]nce customary norms have sufficiently 
crystallized, courts should presumptively incorporate them into federal 
common law, unless the norms have been ousted as law for the United States 
by contrary federal directives.”118 This interpretation forecloses federal 
judges from relying exclusively on independent judicial lawmaking when 
construing CIL, for “their task is not to create rules willy-nilly, but rather to 
discern rules of decision from an existing corpus of customary international 
law rules.”119 In other words, federal judges can apply CIL norms as federal 
common law only after verifying that “a clear international consensus” has 
sufficiently “crystallized” them.120 
Admittedly, we struggled to determine whether “consensus” and “state 
practice” were interchangeable terms according to Koh’s perspective; 
particularly since the sources he cited to illustrate “consensus” are precisely 
 
 115.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (emphasis added). 
 116.  See id. (“There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be 
so divided as the limitations on a state’s power to expropriate the property of aliens.”). 
 117.  Id. at 430 n.34 (emphasis added). 
 118.  See Koh, supra note 4, at 1835 (explaining his view that “even after Erie and Sabbatino, federal 
courts retain legitimate authority to incorporate bona fide rules of customary international law into federal 
common law”); see also id. at 1842 (“Thus, when customary international norms are well-defined, the 
executive branch has regularly urged the federal courts to determine such rules as matters of federal 
law.”). 
 119.  Id. at 1853 (arguing that “[w]hen construing customary international law, federal courts 
arguably exercise less judicial discretion than when making other kinds of federal common law”). 
 120.  Transnational, supra note 46, at 2385–86 (asserting that “over the centuries,” federal courts 
have “determine[d] whether a clear international consensus has crystallized around a legal norm that 
protects or bestows rights upon a group of individuals that includes plaintiffs”). 
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the type of “verbal” evidence that some—including Koh—believe qualify as 
state practice.121 Historically, “consensus” refers to a theory that arose during 
the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries and that described CIL as 
universal law based on the “common consent” of nations.122 Another Erie 
scholar, Ernest Young, claims that modern conceptions of consensus differ 
significantly from traditional notions of custom, for the latter looks 
retroactively at past practices while the former looks to new emerging 
practices.123 He and his co-author, Emily Kadens, add further that this 
normative, forward-looking concept of international consensus has been a 
key enforcement mechanism for CIL norms in human rights litigation.124 
When Koh touts the United States as a key participant in the “traditional 
state practice” that shapes CIL rules, he appears to suggest that state practice 
is, at minimum, one category of evidence from which judges may infer 
international consensus.125 Along this vein, Koh cites to multilateral treaty 
drafting processes, the United Nations, regional fora, standing and ad hoc 
intergovernmental organizations, and diplomatic conferences as “driving 
forces” that shape CIL.126 Koh’s perspective guided our observations when 
determining whether federal courts truly based their CIL determinations on 
a “clear international consensus.” 
In their response to Bradley and Goldsmith’s 1997 piece, Ryan 
Goodman and Derek Jinks extract the same “codification and international 
consensus” requirement from Sabbatino, arguing that the Sabbatino majority 
upholds CIL as part of the federal common law while limiting justiciable 
CIL claims to those that satisfy the consensus requirement.127 Goodman and 
Jinks rest their thesis on the same Sabbatino quotation that Koh emphasizes, 
and they express their thesis using what they call Sabbatino’s “sliding 
 
 121.  See Young, supra note 13, at 386 (“But practice has problems of its own. Disagreements exist 
as to what sort of things ought to count as practice: Should we only count actual state actions, on the 
theory they speak louder than words?”). 
 122.  Kelly, supra note 10, at 510–12. 
 123.  Kadens & Young, supra note 1, at 909. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See Koh, supra note 4, at 1853–54 (attacking the revisionist charge that the CIL lawmaking 
process does not adequately represent state interests because “insofar as [CIL] rules arise from traditional 
[s]tate practice, the United States has been, for most of this century, the world’s primary maker of and 
participant in this practice”). 
 126.  Id. at 1854 (“In nearly all of these organizations and fora, the United States ranks among the 
leading participants.”). 
 127.  Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 512 (“Properly interpreted, Sabbatino stands both for the 
proposition that international law is federal common law and for the proposition that courts should refrain 
from adjudicating international law claims without the requisite degree of codification or international 
consensus.”) (emphasis in original). 
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scale.”128 This sliding scale distinguishes between areas of international law 
that are rife with political divisions among nations and “areas . . . in which 
consensus as to standards is greater and which do not represent a 
battleground for conflicting ideologies.”129 According to Goodman and 
Jinks, Sabbatino establishes the latter category of international law as 
justiciable.130 Furthermore, Goodman and Jinks credit the Filartiga line of 
ATS cases for fully incorporating Sabbatino’s sliding scale framework into 
federal judicial practice.131 They also claim that a tripartite test for judicially-
cognizable CIL flows from the Filartiga case line and effectively narrows 
the range of actionable CIL claims to those based in jus cogens norms.132 
However, this Article stops short of addressing the Goodman and Jinks 
tripartite test. 
Rather, this Article focuses instead on Goodman and Jinks’ claim that 
post-Filartiga courts have engaged in a “prevailing judicial practice” of 
determining when a CIL norm carries enough international consensus to tip 
the sliding scale in the direction of justiciability.133 According to Goodman 
and Jinks, federal judges routinely consult “ample documents and 
international legal instruments” available to them and, from there, determine 
whether a given CIL norm meets the consensus requirement inferred from 
Sabbatino and Filartiga.134 More importantly, they claim that this practice 
yields “uniform results” that “belie the revisionist portrayal of CIL as ‘often 
unwritten . . . unsettled . . . difficult to verify’ and the ‘contours [of which] 
are often uncertain.’”135 
 
 128.  See id. at 482 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)). For 
a later court’s presentation of Sabbatino’s sliding scale doctrine, see also, e.g., Von Dardel v. Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 258 (D.D.C. 1985) (“[T]he [Sabbatino] Court established 
a sort of sliding scale with respect to judicial application of international law: ‘[T]he greater the degree 
of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is 
for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it . . . .’”) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 254). 
 129.  See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 482 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430 n.34) 
(explaining the sliding scale framework). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 512 (“Several insights can be drawn from the Filartiga case line. First, the incorporation 
of Sabbatino’s sliding-scale . . . .”); see also id. at 496 (explaining that Filartiga’s approach is “based 
primarily on the principle of consent,” and that “these standards coincide with the Sabbatino Court’s 
concern for finding a consensus”). 
 132.  See id. at 512 (describing the “tripartite limiting principle”). For Goodman & Jinks’ theory on 
jus cogens norms and the tripartite test, see id. at 497, 512–13. 
 133.  See id. at 469 (“Discussions of federal common law, in particular, are better informed by an 
appreciation of prevailing judicial practices and restraints.”); see also id. at 512 (“[A] thorough account 
of the prevailing judicial practice of finding and applying CIL demonstrates the systematic nature of these 
inquiries.”). 
 134.  See id. at 512 (“The availability of ample documents and international legal instruments enables 
effective adjudication of the status of CIL.”). 
 135.  Id. (citing to Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 855). 
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Goodman and Jinks further contend that Filartiga itself exemplifies this 
routine practice.136 In Filartiga, the Second Circuit acknowledged “the 
universal condemnation of torture . . . by virtually all of the nations of the 
world” by consulting “numerous international agreements.”137 More 
specifically, the court referred to a variety of UN materials, including the 
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
UN General Assembly’s unanimous Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture.138 Additionally, the court also 
relied on domestic sources, including the “Department of State’s human 
rights reports, congressional statutes, and . . . the amicus brief filed on behalf 
of the United States.”139 
According to Goodman and Jinks, Filartiga’s review of both 
“international and domestic legal instruments” is in fact the routine process 
through which federal judges identify actionable CIL.140 Thus, they criticize 
revisionists’ “mischaracteriz[ation]” of this approach which “suggest[s] that 
judges adopt the reverse presumption, finding actionable CIL violations 
when presented with even minimal international documentation.”141 In 
further opposition to the revisionist stance, Goodman and Jinks offer Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic as an additional example of the sliding scale 
approach.142 In Tel-Oren, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals followed a 
method similar to that of the Second Circuit in Filartiga and found that the 
prohibition of nonofficial torture lacked sufficient consensus to qualify as a 
justiciable CIL norm.143 Taken together, the “consensus” view of Koh, 
Goodman and Jinks—if true—ought to translate into increasing citations 
within our data to UN materials, treaties and other international materials. 
As for domestic sources, we would anticipate seeing more “sources of U.S. 
political branch action”144 rather than case law. 
Finally, the “revisionist” story also purports to explain what federal 
courts cite as sources of CIL and how those citations evolved after Erie. As 
 
 136.  Id. at 499 (“Notably, the Filartiga court’s method of analyzing the international law claims has 
also become the routine judicial method.”). 
 137.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (1980). 
 138.  See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 500. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. (“As the following cases demonstrate, Filartiga’s investigation of such international and 
domestic legal instruments typifies the ways in which other CIL claims are deemed actionable in federal 
court.”). 
 141.  Id. at 500–01 n.189. 
 142.  Id. (arguing that Judge Edwards’ concurrence in Tel-Oren “demonstrates both the importance 
of the tripartite test as well as the influence of Sabbatino in such evaluations”). 
 143.  See generally Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 144.  See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 500 n.186–88 (citing to Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 
884, 884–85 n.17). 
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to the “status” question, revisionists argue that CIL requires positive 
incorporation—either through the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute—
prior to becoming federal law.145 Thus, if courts act in accordance with 
revisionist thought, we would anticipate finding an increased number of 
citations to domestic statutes and to the Constitution after Erie.146 
Furthermore, in an ideal revisionist world, Erie’s positivist underpinnings 
ought to translate into more references to state practice in CIL cases.147 
When describing what actually played out in the U.S. federal courts, 
however, revisionists claim that the courts moved in the opposite direction 
after Filartiga, particularly in the context of ATS litigation. According to 
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, the rise in human rights litigation after 
World War II brought a “new” CIL with it.148 Unlike the “traditional CIL” 
of the past, which primarily governed interstate matters and was based in 
state practice, the “new” CIL primarily regulated states’ treatment of their 
own citizens and held less relation to state practice.149 
In a subsequent article, Bradley, Goldsmith, and David Moore describe 
how the Second Circuit applied “new” CIL in Filartiga by prioritizing verbal 
evidence of state assent over actual state practice.150 Their article includes 
examples of “verbal assent” evidence in Filartiga, such as the United 
Nations Charter, the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the non-binding Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture, multiple treaties that the U.S. had not ratified, and 
 
 145.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 817 (critiquing the modern position and 
“conclud[ing] that, contrary to conventional wisdom, CIL should not have the status of federal common 
law”). 
 146.  Bradley et al., supra note 35, at 886 (“[T]he revisionist view was that CIL does not 
automatically have the status of federal common law and that after Erie, federal courts needed some 
authorization from either the political branches or the Constitution in order to apply CIL.”). This last 
hypothesis requires extra caution, however, since such an increase could also result from the longstanding 
tradition of using CIL as a tool for statutory interpretation under the Charming Betsy canon, whereby 
U.S. courts interpret federal statutes and treaties to avoid conflicts with the law of nations. For the origin 
of the canon, see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains . . . .”). For an empirical study on CIL as a statutory interpretation tool in the U.S., see generally 
Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Customary International Law and Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis 
of Federal Court Decisions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1118 (2014). 
 147.  See Bradley et al., supra note 35, at 890 (asserting that “some courts [including the Second 
Circuit] began to develop a revisionist position with respect to the sources of CIL in ATS litigation,” and 
that the Second Circuit, “pull[ing] back from the approach in Filartiga,” later held that “courts must look 
to concrete evidence of the customs and practices of States”) (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 
414 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 148.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 831–32, 838–43. 
 149.  Id. at 842. 
 150.  See Bradley et al., supra note 35, at 889–91. 
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various prohibitions on torture featured in national constitutions.151 These 
types of sources are roughly the same as those that Goodman and Jinks 
reference as examples of “international consensus” evidence.152 In fact, 
Bradley, Goldsmith and Moore use the terms “verbal assent” and 
“consensus” interchangeably.153 
The revisionists do not stop there. Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore 
further argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
encouraged a new approach to determining CIL in ATS cases by eschewing 
Filartiga’s reliance on evidence of verbal assent and returning to the 
“revisionist” method of citing actual state practice.154 Other scholars agree 
with this positivist reading of Sosa, and have extended it beyond ATS 
litigation into all CIL-related cases decided in U.S. federal courts.155 
For our study, we split the post-Filartiga data into subperiods—1980 to 
2003 and 2004 to 2015—in order to determine whether Sosa truly marked a 
retreat from “consensus” or “verbal assent,” or whether it was merely an 
outlier in its pro-practice approach to CIL. If our data revealed more citations 
to variables representing “verbal assent” than to “actual practice” 
variables,156 then perhaps CIL lacks the “positivist foundation” that Dodge, 
Henkin, and others have relied upon in their opposition to revisionist 
arguments. That said, such results might vindicate the “consensus” camp of 
the modern position and ultimately lend credence to the concerns that 
Bradley and Goldsmith expressed back in 1997. 
V. PREDICTIONS 
To summarize, the Erie literature provides three different narratives in 
response to the “sources” question about CIL—the “state practice” story, the 
 
 151.  Id. at 889. 
 152.  See supra pp. 262–63. 
 153.  Bradley et al., supra note 35, at 890 (describing how the Second Circuit eventually “pulled back 
from the approach in Filartiga, which, as we noted earlier, had relied heavily on verbal statements and 
‘consensus’ and had downplayed actual practice”). 
 154.  Id. at 910, 910 tbl.2 (claiming that Sosa “resolved” the debate about the “Scope and Sources of 
CIL to be applied by Courts in ATS litigation” and, in “Table 2,” that Sosa calls for a “[l]imited set of 
CIL norms, with increased emphasis on the practice of nations”). To be fair, not all scholars who interpret 
Sosa as endorsing a return to traditional state practice would self-identify as revisionists. See John O. 
McGinnis, Sosa and the Derivation of Customary International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 83, at 481, 488–89 (interpreting Sosa as 
endorsing a “positivist, inductive paradigm” for CIL that not only calls for “hard evidence of actual state 
practice,” but that also “reflects the movement to positivism contained in Erie”). 
 155.  McGinnis, supra note 154, at 493 (concluding that Sosa’s positivism “may have important 
implications for deriving customary international law even outside the context of the ATS”). 
 156.  See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text for examples of variables representing “verbal 
assent.” 
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“international consensus” story, and the “revisionist” story. Scholars have 
summoned all three narratives to bolster their arguments regarding the 
“status” of CIL in U.S. law. To test each narrative’s validity, we identified 
various sources cited by the U.S. federal judiciary as evidence of CIL and 
we tracked how citation rates to these sources evolved over time. 
We strategically divided our data into specific eras based on three 
landmark cases: Erie, Filartiga, and Sosa. If the “state practice” story is most 
reflective of reality, our time divisions should make little difference; with or 
without Erie, state practice would always exist as CIL’s positive foundation. 
If the data reflect this assertion, our results would not only vindicate Dodge 
and Henkin’s theories, but also the ICJ’s traditional definition of CIL. If the 
“international consensus” story is most accurate, we would anticipate the 
1980s representing a crucial turning point in our data. Although Goodman 
and Jinks credit Sabbatino for providing courts the sliding scale concept to 
work with, they also credit Filartiga and its progeny for solidifying the 
sliding scale as an accepted form of judicial practice.157 Therefore, we would 
expect to observe an increase in citations to “verbal assent” variables after 
the 1980’s. Finally, if our data vindicate the “revisionist” story, we would 
expect higher citation rates to sources representing traditional state practice 
before Erie, higher citation rates to sources illustrating “verbal assent” after 
Filartiga (and after World War II, generally), and an increase in citations to 
sources representing traditional state practice in ATS litigation and other 
cases after Sosa. 
Taking these three narratives together with general academic CIL 
accounts, our predictions may be summarized as follows: 
First, in the pre-Erie period from 1790 to 1938, during which federal 
courts applied “general common law,” we would anticipate observing a 
higher rate of citations to foreign cases and academic treatises, and a 
relatively high citation rate to sources offering traditional evidence of state 
practice. 
Second, in the post-Erie period, we would anticipate uncovering a 
difference in the types of sources cited during the periods from 1938 to 1980 
(before the emergence of the modern position via Filartiga) and from 1980 
to 2015 (after the modern position emerged). Furthermore, if the prevailing 
Erie scholars on both sides of the debate are correct, then this difference 
should manifest itself most significantly in cases involving individual rights, 
and particularly in ATS cases. 
Third, we would generally expect to observe an increase in citations to 
international sources after Filartiga. If Dodge and Henkin’s “state practice” 
 
 157.  Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 480, 469–70. 
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theories are accurate, the vast majority of these sources will be those 
traditionally associated with state practice. Additionally, we would expect to 
see variables representing state practice consistently throughout our three 
time periods. If Koh, Goodman and Jinks’s “international consensus” view 
is accurate, we would expect an increase after 1980 in citations to UN 
materials, international committee materials, treaties, and other types of 
international legal instruments, since Filartiga would have propagated 
Sabbatino’s sliding scale approach by that date. Finally, if the “revisionist” 
view is accurate, and Sosa indeed signaled a return to grounding CIL in state 
practice, we would expect an increase in variables representing traditional 
state practice in our data between 2004 and 2015. 
Armed with these predictions, we examined the data. 
VI. METHODOLOGY 
We designed our study with a particular goal in mind—to set aside what 
judges say that they are doing and to uncover the actual practices of the U.S. 
federal judiciary in cases applying CIL.158 To do so, we created a database 
of federal cases decided in the United States between the early-1790s and 
2015. Although most scholarship regarding Erie and CIL focuses on 
Supreme Court cases, we included within our database case law not only 
from the Supreme Court, but also circuit courts and a variety of federal 
district courts159 to develop a comprehensive picture of judicial treatment of 
CIL across the entire federal system.  We then identified individual opinions 
within each case in our database—including majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions—that discussed CIL and we created a database of CIL 
determinations. We included cases that both recognized and did not 
recognize CIL, and if a given opinion covered multiple issues yielding 
separate CIL determinations, we entered each issue as a separate entry. 
In building our database, we followed two strategies to obtain adequate 
samples from each level of the federal judiciary while also making sure to 
include cases that key authors in the Erie debate have emphasized. First, we 
perused seminal articles on Erie and CIL and extracted the cases to which 
the authors attached importance. Our proxy for determining whether a case 
was important was whether it was discussed in the text of the article as 
relevant to the debate.  Among the authors whose canonical articles we 
examined were Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, Beth Stephens, Harold 
 
 158.  For the inspiration behind our basic methodology, see generally Choi & Gulati, supra note 14. 
 159.  The database also includes a tiny batch of cases from the original U.S. Circuit Courts that 
Congress established shortly after it enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789. See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. 
Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793). 
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Hongju Koh, and Ernest Young.160 We also examined each chapter of the 
volume edited by David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey, and William S. 
Dodge—a work widely considered the best compilation of authoritative 
accounts of CIL’s evolution throughout U.S. history.161 Here, we did not 
code every case mentioned, but instead focused on extracting an equal 
selection of cases from each decade between 1790 and 2011—the volume’s 
date of publication. The foregoing process primarily yielded cases from the 
Supreme Court and, to a lesser extent, the circuit courts. 
Second, to bolster our sample of CIL cases from U.S. circuit courts, we 
selected at random a subset of cases using Westlaw database searches with 
the terms “customary international law,” “custom” (in conjunction with 
“international law”), and the “law of nations.”  Overall, we aimed to extract 
a roughly equal number of CIL determinations from each level of the federal 
judiciary (the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and district courts) and also 
across the pre- and post-Erie periods. Our initial goal was to acquire between 
250 and 300 observations, and our final sample consisted of 267. Of these 
observations, 97 were from the Supreme Court, 71 from circuit courts, and 
98 from district courts. Furthermore, 121 observations came from pre-Erie 
cases and 146 came from post-Erie cases. 
After isolating each judicial determination with regards to CIL, we 
selected “variables” based on what the relevant literature commonly cites as 
sources of CIL. Then, for each CIL determination, we tallied the number of 
unique evidentiary items (pertaining to the variables) that the court cited as 
definitive evidence of CIL. For example, if a judicial opinion cited 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England and de Vattel’s The Law 
of Nations, the evidentiary item count in the “Academic Sources” column of 
our spreadsheet for that opinion would be a “2.”162 Ultimately, we estimated 
counts of sources being cited in each entry by giving a maximum score of 
“1” if a specific type of source was cited. So, if a case cited a particular 
domestic statute six times, we counted it as citing one domestic statute (a 
“1”). However, if it cited six different domestic statutes, we counted that as 
a “6.” 
In the end, we selected eleven varieties of sources as our variables to 
code for: 
 
 160.  See sources cited supra notes 4, 5, and 13. 
 161.  See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, 
supra note 83. 
 162.  We only coded whether specific sources were cited to more than once. For example, if a court 
cited to Blackstone’s Commentaries ten times within the same opinion, we would tally that source only 
once under the “Academic Sources” column, not ten times. 
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Academic Sources: This category covers a broad range of material 
from legal academia, including treatises, international law digests, and law 
review articles. On numerous occasions—especially in pre-Erie cases—
opinions referred to specific treatise authors without citing or quoting from 
a specific work. In these situations, we coded author references as academic 
sources. Relatedly, if an opinion cited to multiple works from a single author, 
we coded each individual work as a separate academic source. This category 
includes both U.S. and international sources, and it represents a variety of 
perspectives—from the “natural law” philosophies of Grotius and de Vattel 
to literature advocating the pro-modern position that Bradley and Goldsmith 
predicted judges would reference after 1997.163 
Domestic Cases: Whenever judicial opinions cited case law from a 
U.S. court, we coded the citation under the “Domestic Cases” variable. For 
example, if a judge sitting on the Eleventh Circuit cited three Eleventh 
Circuit cases, five Supreme Court cases, one federal district court case, and 
one state court case, we coded each of these ten cases as “Domestic Cases.” 
We coded only a small number of state court cases, and did not feel justified 
in separating this variable into categories for federal and state cases. 
Domestic Statutes: Here, we coded any federal or state statutes cited 
as evidence of CIL. As with the materials coded under the Domestic Cases 
variable, most of the statutes coded here were federal rather than state 
statutes. 
Treaties: This variable includes any treaty or international agreement 
between states. Throughout our data collection, we noted the number of 
treaties that courts specifically referenced as codifications of state practice. 
In keeping with the revisionist label of “verbal assent” evidence, we note 
here that treaties fall under this category. 
UN Resolutions: As with treaties, this type of evidence qualifies as 
evidence of “verbal assent” for revisionists. 
UN/League Conference and Committee Reports: As with treaties 
and United Nations resolutions, this type of evidence qualifies as evidence 
of “verbal assent” for revisionists. 
International Tribunal Sources: This variable encompasses any 
cases, charters, or statutes derived from international tribunals such as the 
ICJ, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), or the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
to name a few. 
 
 163.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 875 (“Because of their relative unfamiliarity with 
international law and because of the special difficulties associated with determining international law 
rules, judges tend to be heavily influenced by academic sources in this context.”). 
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International Committee Reports: This variable includes any non-
UN reports from committees such as the International Law Association or 
the Red Cross. Like treaties, United Nations resolutions, and UN or League 
Conference and Committee reports, this variable qualifies as evidence of 
“verbal assent.” 
Actions by States: This variable describes the traditional evidence for 
state practice. Basically, whenever we encountered an opinion finding CIL 
when “State ‘X’ did ‘Y,’” we coded it under this variable. 
Statements from State Officials: A typical source of opinio juris, we 
used this variable to track letters from Attorneys General and secretaries of 
state, presidential proclamations, and military handbooks, among other 
official statements. 
Parties’ Agreements: This variable encompasses agreements between 
litigating parties that ultimately determine a rule or norm amounts to CIL. 
The vast majority of the opinions we coded rarely cited this variety of 
evidence. Consequently, this paper does not devote significant analysis to 
this variable. 
After selecting the variables above, we decided how to divide the time 
periods we coded. The two breaks in time that we chose were first, of course, 
before and after Erie in 1938.  Secondarily, and within the post-Erie era, we 
assessed the pre- and post-1980 periods, all in keeping with the idea that the 
Second Circuit’s 1980 Filartiga decision and the Restatement (Third) 
Foreign Relations in 1987 constituted the two “pillars” of the move toward 
the modern position.164 Finally, we further divided the post-1980 period into 
pre- and post-2004 periods, so that we could test the revisionists’ theories 
regarding Sosa. In sum, the breaks in the data we examine are at 1938, 1980 
and 2004. 
VII. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Our results tell a story of the sources of authority that U.S. federal courts 
have relied upon in making CIL determinations over roughly 200 years. We 
begin by describing our statistical results. We then break these results into 
component parts—first by level of court and then according to the type of 
case. Table 1A and Figure 1A report our results in terms of the total number 
of each variety of evidence cited. 
 
 164.  Id. at 831 (“[T]wo events provided the central pillars for the modern position: the Second 
Circuit’s Filartiga decision and the publication of the Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law.”). 
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A. Overall Picture 





















Parties Agreement 5 0 0 5 1 4 
International Committee Materials 25 2 11 12 1 11 
UN/League Resolutions 32 0 1 31 12 19 
Other UN Materials 76 0 22 54 18 36 
International Tribunal  90 5 25 60 13 47 
Foreign Statutes 99 33 9 57 55 2 
Domestic Statutes 115 22 27 66 17 49 
Statements by State Officials 117 63 30 24 8 16 
Actions by States 126 105 11 10 6 4 
Treaties 214 35 28 151 68 83 
Foreign Cases 314 210 96 8 4 4 
Academic 915 471 269 175 87 88 
Domestic Cases 1166 407 287 472 176 296 
 
The first column of Table 1A shows that the dominant variety of 
evidence cited across our 200-plus year time frame is the domestic case. 
Academic sources are the second most widely-cited variety of evidence. 
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Together, domestic cases and academic sources are cited as evidence of CIL 
with greater regularity than the other eleven varieties of sources combined. 
Whether one views state practice narrowly—as only those sources qualifying 
under the “actions of states” variable—or broadly—including the “verbal 
assent” variable—direct evidence of the state practice and opinio juris 
materials that, theoretically, should be driving every CIL determination 
appears relatively insignificant to U.S. federal courts investigating CIL 
matters. 
Table 1A and Figure 1A demonstrate that domestic cases remained the 
most widely-cited source both before and after Erie. Additionally, academic 
sources remained the second most cited source both before and after Erie. 
Therefore, in terms of what U.S. federal judges have relied on most when 
discerning CIL norms—namely, their own pronouncements—there seems to 
have been little change before and after the 1938 Supreme Court case that 
scholars have spent decades arguing over. 
Critics may dismiss our results in Table 1A on grounds that U.S. federal 
judges have a well-known tendency to cite multiple prior federal court cases 
in their opinions, even in situations where a single citation may suffice. 
Furthermore, there is potential for outlier problems where courts cite many 
times to a particular type of source. To correct for these potential 
shortcomings, we provide an alternate representation of our data in Table 
1B, and Figure 1B. Instead of reporting raw counts of the number of 
materials cited, we report the percentage of determinations in which a type 
of material was cited at least once. We also examine whether there are 
statistically significant differences across the time periods in terms of the 
fraction of materials that are cited. Here, our method of interpreting the 
data—in terms of fractional use—avoids the potential influence of outlier 
opinions where a disproportionate number of citations are made to a 
particular type of evidence. Thus, for example, if a particular Supreme Court 
case, such as The Scotia, cites forty different pieces of evidence of state 
practice, we count only one citation (whereas our prior representation would 
have counted forty). 
It is worth reiterating that at least some of the authors in the Erie debate 
would probably not have predicted significant changes in our data at the time 
Erie was decided. Rather, they imply that Erie’s relevance to CIL 
determinations peaked in the 1980s, when the Second Circuit decided 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and the Restatement (Third) was published. The issue 
of Erie’s relevance to CIL then supposedly reemerged in 2004 with Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain. To test these effects, we have separated our data into pre- 
and post-1938 periods (Erie); pre- and post-1980 periods (Filartiga/ 
Restatement); and finally pre- and post-2003 (Sosa) periods. 
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By analyzing our results—as corrected above—using significance tests 
across time periods, we are able to observe a nuanced picture of the changes 
in what types of materials are cited by the courts as sources of CIL over time. 
As a threshold matter, despite our corrections to account for the potential 
shortcomings described above, domestic cases and academic materials 
remain the most widely-cited sources of evidence by a significant margin—
domestic cases are cited in seventy-six percent of all CIL determinations and 
academic materials are cited in sixty-nine percent. By contrast, citations to 
the actions of states—the core evidence of state practice—appears among 
the least-cited varieties of sources and is cited in only seven percent of 
determinations. 
Academic materials appear to have declined significantly in importance 
during the post-Erie period. This decline, however, did not occur 
immediately after Erie, for our data shows an increase in citations to 
academic materials—from seventy-four percent of CIL determinations to 
eighty-eight percent—during the period from 1938 to 1980. Rather, the 
declining importance of academic materials occurred after 1980 when its 
citation rate plummeted from eighty-eight percent to fifty-seven percent. 
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To the extent that academic citations during the pre-Erie period were 
primarily to natural law masters such as Grotius, Pufendorf, and de Vattel, 
the declining citation rate to academic sources may indicate a clear move 
away from “finding CIL” in the works of natural law scholars and the 
perspectives of foreign common law cases.165 In fact, after 1980, the 
percentage of cases in which this type of material was cited to foreign cases 
dropped from thirty-seven percent to seven percent.166 However, we are 
uncertain whether courts were citing to academic materials in the pre-1980 
period because of the natural law perspectives on international law, or 
because these materials documented state practice and opinio juris at the 
time. This ambiguity is difficult to resolve, because most judges in the cases 
we coded cite to academic sources without explaining their reasoning. 
 
 165.  Although we did not count specific numbers here, our impression from coding the cases is that, 
as citations to international digests died out, the most-cited treatise we coded was the Restatement (Third). 
Since the Restatement arguably reflects the modern position, this could be (with further research) a 
potentially revealing tidbit. 
 166.  Our impression from the coding was that the vast majority of these cases were British. This fact 
(and the drop in the citations to these materials) might counter the claim that judges have continued 
applying CIL as a type of general common law inherited from England. We did not count specific 





























Figure 1B. Materials Cited in Percent 
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Whatever the rationale underlying the judges’ decisions, we observed a 
dramatic drop in U.S. federal courts’ citations to academic material and 
foreign cases for CIL determinations after 1980. 
Our data uncovered other significant results. It is interesting—and 
perhaps puzzling from a revisionist standpoint—that the increase in citations 
to domestic statutes did not occur concurrently with the shift away from 
citations to academic material. Instead the former occurred immediately after 
Erie, during the post-1938 period, roughly forty years before the shift away 
from academic sources. Thus, the true pattern followed by the U.S. federal 
judiciary in selecting their sources for CIL determinations played out in 
stages. Stage one encompasses the shift toward greater citations to domestic 
statutes and began in the post-1938 period. Stage two encompasses a shift 
away from citing academic materials, foreign cases and statutes, and begins 
in the 1980s—roughly forty years after Erie. The largest shift in the post-
Erie period, however, involves an increased reliance on citations to domestic 
cases (from citations in fifty-nine percent of CIL determinations before Erie 
to roughly ninety percent after Erie). Scholars at the center of the traditional 
CIL debate have seemingly overlooked this shift, as they rarely discuss it. 
Although an increased citation rate for domestic statutes in CIL 
determinations is consistent with the revisionist position, it is likely short-
sighted to conclude that this post-Erie shift was perfectly in accord with 
revisionism.167 Rather, something else may have been afoot, because our data 
also demonstrate a prominent increase in citations to international materials 
indicative of “verbal assent,” including UN resolutions, reports from 
international committees constituted by organizations such as the UN or the 
International Red Cross,168 international tribunals, and international treaties. 
The most significant of these shifts occurred with international treaties, 
which underwent an increase of similar magnitude (ten to fifteen percent to 
around thirty to thirty-five percent) to the increase in citations to domestic 
statutes. 
 
 167.  The revisionist position, at least the version proffered by Bradley and Goldsmith in 1997, see 
generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, is not just that Erie mandated a move toward domestic 
sources of law, but rather that Erie requires that CIL be positively incorporated into domestic law through 
two specific domestic sources—the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes—before courts can rightfully 
apply CIL as federal common law. See id. at 871 (arguing that “in the absence of federal political branch 
authorization, CIL is not a source of federal law”). So, from this perspective, the finding that domestic 
cases are the most-cited source may be troubling for the revisionists even before we get to the increase in 
citations to international sources. In other words, the domestication that revisionists look for is not the 
same kind of domestication we found here. 
 168.  When referring to committee reports, we refer namely to sources such as International Red 
Cross expert committee materials that study the evolution of customary practices. Sometimes, courts cite 
to an actual report, but not always. 
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To summarize, our data support both the “revisionist” story and the 
“international consensus” story. On one hand, U.S. federal courts appear to 
have complied with what revisionists consider the dictates of Erie by citing 
greater numbers of domestic statutes after 1938. Additionally, our data 
illustrates something of an Erie tailwind during the post-1980 period—
citations to academic material and foreign domestic sources dropped 
significantly. On the other hand, not all of the changes we observed related 
to domestic sources; we also observed significant increases in post-1938 
citations to the varieties of sources that Goodman and Jinks associate with 
consensus, including international tribunal decisions and materials from the 
UN and international committees. Among the international consensus or 
“verbal assent” variables, the most significant trend we observed was an 
increasing number of citations to treaties. In the period from 1980 to 2015, 
treaties were cited in forty-five percent of all determinations—a significant 
increase from fourteen percent during the pre-1938 period. 
One question we encountered was whether the increase in citations to 
international materials vindicated the “state practice” story in any 
meaningful way. To explore this question, we separated all citations to 
treaties included within our data depending on whether the treaty codified a 
state practice. Treaties, of course, can take many different forms. Some 
reflect a codification of state practice, while others reflect the opposite; that 
is, a treaty is necessary precisely because there is no prevailing practice 
among nations to define how they will behave under certain circumstances. 
To examine the percentage of our citations that referenced treaties codifying 
a state practice, we entered a specific code if the citing court explicitly stated 
that the treaty codified state practice. Overall, roughly five percent of the 
treaty citations we coded contained explicit statements that the treaty at issue 
reflected some form of generalized state practice.169 In other words, although 
the increase in citations to treaties is noteworthy for the “international 
consensus” story, the trend does not appear to reflect an increase in judicial 
references to traditional evidence of state practice. 
Despite significant trends both before and after the decisions in the 
1930s and the 1980s, judicial behavior remained largely static around the 
time of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa, the lone exception being a 
continued increase in citations to domestic statutes. In fact, citations to 
domestic statutes surpassed citations to treaties during the period between 
 
 169.  Choi and Gulati find essentially the same result in their examination of international tribunal 
determinations of CIL. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 14, at 132–33 (reporting that courts will sometimes 
“specify that [they were] citing a treaty because that treaty represented a codification of past state practice 
and opinion juris,” but that “it happens rarely,” and concluding that “the dominant form of evidence being 
cited is forward-looking or aspirational”). 
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2004 and 2015. This trend should comfort revisionists. Nevertheless, 
citations to verbal assent variables—particularly international tribunal cases 
and international committee materials—continued to increase during this 
period. On the other hand, citations to acts of states remained at a miniscule 
five percent—a level that fails to mesh with revisionists’ story of a return to 
reliance on traditional state practice when determining CIL. Most 
importantly, neither of these variables surpasses domestic cases or academic 
sources, which remain the two most cited sources. Based on these 
observations, Sosa may have been less dramatic a turning point than 
revisionists believe. 
The next question we faced was whether our seemingly contradictory 
findings stemmed primarily from different types of courts or cases. 
B. Type of Court 
The existing academic research regarding CIL determinations in U.S. 
federal courts has focused primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court and, to a 
lesser extent, a small number of circuit court decisions. The vast majority of 
determinations, however, are made at the district court level—and district 
court opinions, researchers have found, tend to be far more constrained than 
those of higher courts.170 Thus, we questioned whether we would observe 
different patterns of judicial practices in CIL determinations at different 
levels of the federal judiciary. 
  
 
 170.  E.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 79 (2013) (presenting empirical 
evidence that district court judges are far less likely than judges in higher courts to go off on tangents 
based on their personal policy preferences). 
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Court   
Parties Agreement 1% 6% 0% * 
UN/League Resolutions 3% 15% 1% *** 
International Committee Materials 3% 13% 4% * 
Foreign Statutes 5% 8% 13%   
International Tribunal  6% 25% 7% *** 
Other UN Materials 7% 24% 6% *** 
Actions by States 8% 7% 7%   
Statements by State Officials 17% 27% 13%   
Treaties 20% 55% 19% *** 
Foreign Cases 21% 14% 32% * 
Domestic Statutes 29% 35% 15% * 
Academic 61% 69% 77%   
Domestic Cases 85% 86% 60% *** 
For the sake of simplicity, we present a single table—Table 2A—with 
breakdowns of our observations across different levels of the judiciary. Table 
2A displays the percentages of each type of material cited at least once in 
each CIL determination. As the Table illustrates, we observed several 
statistically significant differences. Unsurprisingly, our data indicate that 
citations to domestic cases dominated across all three levels of the judiciary. 
Furthermore, increases in citations to domestic cases were substantial and 
statistically significant in the post-Erie period for two of the three levels—
trial courts and the Supreme Court. To a lesser extent, we also observed 
statistically significant increases in citations to international materials.  
However, the number of citations in all three levels of the judiciary appeared 
to trend in the same direction for all sources considered. To the extent that 
there are differences in the strength of these trends, they are likely the 
product of differences in the number of cases at each judicial level. We also 
examined the data for each court type during each of the time periods 
described above (designated by Erie, Filartiga and Sosa), but did not detect 
sufficiently significant differences among the trends we observed across the 
three time periods. We do not report that additional material here. 
C. Type of Case 
To the extent that the “international consensus” and the “revisionist” 
stories overlap, advocates of both the revisionist and modern positions 
suggest that the types of CIL determinations occurring in ATS and individual 
rights cases (all of which would likely have appeared in the post-Erie period) 
were unique. There was little evidence of state practice to support the 
judiciary’s proposed CIL rules on many human rights matters. In many 
cases, past state practice, if anything, merely illustrated specific behavior that 
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judges wanted to eliminate in furtherance of human rights. As a result, 
revisionists assert that judges presiding over human rights cases were more 
likely to cite to “verbal assent” sources as evidence for CIL than judges 
presiding over cases requiring more traditional CIL determinations.171 
Meanwhile, Goodman and Jinks credit Filartiga and subsequent human 
rights litigation for setting Sabbatino’s sliding scale into motion, thereby 
establishing an “international consensus” approach to CIL determinations.172 
Given the strong association between “verbal assent” and the concept of 
“international consensus,” a higher citation rate to verbal assent sources in 
human rights cases would be just as consistent with this modern position 
view as it would be with the revisionists’ claims. 
 









(n=75)   
Actions by States 9% 4%   1% 9% * 
Parties Agreement 0% 5%   6% 1%   
Foreign Statues 7% 7%   3% 11%   
Foreign Cases 27% 12% * 3% 5%   
UN/League Resolutions 5% 13%   15% 5% * 
Statements by State Officials 30% 13% * 15% 20%   
UN/League Conference and 
Committee Reports 
30% 18%  24% 19% 
  
International Tribunal  18% 21%   30% 11% ** 
Domestic Statutes 30% 38%   46% 25%   
Treaties 30% 47% * 45% 39%   
Academic 77% 60% * 59% 71%   
Domestic Cases 89% 91%   92% 89%   
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 171.  See Bradley et al., supra note 35, at 889–91. 
 172.  See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 512. 
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To examine this hypothesis, we separated our data in two ways. First, 
we coded each of our CIL determinations according to the subject matter of 
the underlying case—in particular, whether the case involved interstate 
relations (e.g., diplomatic immunity) or individual rights (e.g., torture of a 
domestic citizen). Second, we coded each of the CIL determinations in one 
of two ways depending on whether the case had been brought under the ATS.  
Table 3, and Figures 3A and 3B illustrate our results. Ultimately, we 
observed few indicia that courts were behaving differently in individual 
rights or ATS cases than in other type of cases. Perhaps the differences that 
the Erie debaters theorized may have manifested themselves had courts 
actually sought evidence of state practice in cases with subject matters 
characterized as “traditional” international law. However, our data 
demonstrate quite clearly that traditional sources of state practice were 
simply not a significant resource for courts making CIL determinations. 
VIII. IMPLICATIONS 
Our study reveals that U.S. federal courts have relied primarily on 
domestic case law in deciding issues based on CIL, and secondarily on 
academic sources.173 In other words, the CIL that U.S. federal courts have 
 
 173.  See supra Table 1A and Figure 1A. 
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applied has largely been a product of their own making, and the remaining 
body of influential CIL has derived from “the professors, the writers of 
textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles in leading international 
law journals.”174 Only after consulting these two sources have federal judges 
incorporated international materials into their CIL analyses. This trend began 
before Erie and has since continued. Not even the supposedly game-
changing advent of human rights litigation has managed to displace domestic 
case law as the primary resource that U.S. courts cite to in CIL 
determinations.175 
Turning to the matter of what other sources are cited, and how these 
citations have evolved, we find that citations to international sources did 
increase after Erie. The major portion of this increase occurred after 
Filartiga was decided in 1980. To what extent, then, has our data vindicated 
the “state practice” story or the “international consensus” story? Thus far, 
we have discussed “state practice” and “international consensus” as separate 
and distinct concepts, where the former includes both sources representing 
traditional state practice and sources illustrating “verbal assent” that 
revisionists deride as mere “cheap talk.”176 As we have reiterated, however, 
the international legal community continues to debate the meaning of “state 
practice.” On one hand, many regard actual state action as the best evidence 
of state practice on the assumption that words are more indicative of opinio 
juris.177 On the other hand, some scholars argue that so-called “verbal” 
evidence of CIL qualifies as evidence of “state practice,” in which case the 
terms “state practice” and “international consensus” effectively become 
interchangeable.178 This ongoing disagreement begs an important question: 
 
 174.  Sohn, supra note 20, at 399. 
 175.  Ryan Scoville conducted a similar study to ours with roughly the same methodology, only his 
piece focuses exclusively on post-Sosa US case law. In that study, citations to domestic sources came out 
on top. See Ryan M. Scoville, Finding Customary International Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1893, 1911 fig.8 
(2016) (finding that domestic citations accounted for roughly forty-eight percent of post-Sosa citations). 
 176.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as Common Law 
Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE, supra note 14, at 34, 53 (stating that “verbal actions should be 
considered with caution, since they might simply be ‘cheap talk’ as opposed to the expression of a genuine 
preference”). 
 177.  See supra pp. 247–48; see also Bradley, supra note 176, at 53 (“There has also been much 
debate in the literature about whether verbal acts by states can be considered a form of state practice. 
Those who object to such classification worry that these acts will end up being ‘double counted’ as both 
practice and evidence of opinio juris.”). 
 178.  See Omri Sender & Michael Wood, Custom’s Bright Future: The Continuing Importance of 
Customary International Law, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE, supra note 14, at 360, 368 (“[S]everal long-standing 
theoretical controversies related to customary international law have by now been put to rest. It is no 
longer contested, for example, that verbal acts, and not just physical conduct, may count as ‘practice.’”); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. b 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (explaining that state practice can take the form of “diplomatic acts and 
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should conflicting definitions of state practice substantially affect how we 
analyze our data? 
In a way, it should (and does). If we set aside sources representing 
verbal assent and adopt a traditional conception of state practice, then at least 
some of the modern position’s arguments regarding CIL appear to crumble. 
Consider William Dodge’s claim that CIL is immune from Erie’s positivist 
mandate because it has always been grounded in state practice as its source 
of positive authority.179 True, citation rates to “actions by states” have never 
been ‘zero percent,’ but they have never risen above ten percent in any given 
era.180 If state practice consists only of nations’ concrete actions, then CIL’s 
positivist foundation may be too meager to survive Erie in the manner that 
Dodge or Louis Henkin propose. This finding would not only be bad news 
for Dodge and Henkin, but also for revisionists, as it quashes their hopes for 
a post-Sosa comeback of traditional state practice variables.181 
If, however, we expand the meaning of practice to include evidence of 
verbal assent—including statements by state officials, U.N. resolutions, 
committee reports from the International Law Commission, international 
tribunal decisions, or recitals in treaties and other international agreements—
our results support the very concept that Goodman, Jinks and Koh have 
labeled as “international consensus.” Assuming that scholars like Dodge and 
Henkin adopt this construction of state practice, the modern position’s two 
“camps” referenced above would likely merge into a single “consensus” 
camp.182 If we revisit our data under these circumstances, do the theoretical 
foundations of this “consensus” camp fare any better than those of the 
traditional state practice camp? 
The answer to this question is not straightforward. In theory, as Koh 
sees it, federal courts exercise less judicial discretion when making CIL 
determinations than when making other kinds of determinations under 
federal law, “as their task is not to create rules willy-nilly, but rather to 
discern rules of decision from an existing corpus of customary international 
law rules.”183 Put differently, CIL norms qualify as federal common law only 
after “a clear international consensus” has sufficiently “crystallized” them.184 
 
instructions as well as public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of policy, 
whether they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other states”). 
 179.  See supra pp. 258. 
 180.  See Table 1B, Figure 1B. 
 181.  See supra pp. 264–65; see also Table 1B (citations to “Actions of States” stayed at five percent 
after 1980, indicating no change after Sosa in 2004). 
 182.  See supra Part IV.c. 
 183.  Koh, supra note 4, at 1853. 
 184.  Transnational, supra note 46, at 2385–86 (asserting that “over the centuries,” federal courts 
have “determine[d] whether a clear international consensus has crystallized around a legal norm that 
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As Goodman and Jinks argue, this phenomenon should be manifested 
through judicial practice in the form of Sabbatino’s sliding scale.185 
After re-examining our own data, however, we are uncertain whether to 
agree with this point. Although we observed increasingly higher citation 
rates over time to variables representing international consensus—with 
treaties showing the most dramatic increase—each of these rates paled in 
comparison to the citation rates to domestic case law at all times.186 For that 
matter, most variables representing verbal assent also showed consistently 
lower citation rates than academic sources; including after 1980 when 
citations to academic sources decreased. Even when treaties reached citation 
rates between thirty percent and fifty percent, they were still dwarfed by the 
citation rates for domestic cases, which remained at roughly 90%. Even if 
federal judges have consulted an “existing corpus” of CIL rules, they appear 
to have relied primarily on an existing corpus of the federal judiciary’s 
interpretation of those rules. 
Therefore, we believe adherents to the modern position should ask a 
more appropriate sources-related question—just how much international 
consensus is enough? In other words, how high must citation rates to 
international sources be to conclude that judges have sufficiently 
“crystallized” CIL norms into justiciable issues in U.S. federal courts? Put 
another way, at what point is the gap between citations to domestic cases and 
citations to international sources so wide that we may justifiably accuse 
judges of “creating CIL rules willy-nilly” rather than discerning them from 
an “existing corpus of customary international law rules”? 
Setting aside the “consensus” versus “state practice” issue, we 
encountered difficulty accounting for the high citation rates to treaties over 
time. As mentioned earlier, our results cut against any argument that courts 
have cited to treaties as codifications of state practice.187 Another possibility, 
however, is that courts have made a revisionist attempt to incorporate CIL 
into domestic federal law through treaties.188 We ultimately dismissed this 
idea, because many of the treaties cited by courts were treaties that the United 
States had not ratified and therefore were not part of federal law. 
 
protects or bestows rights upon a group of individuals that includes plaintiffs”). 
 185.  Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 482. 
 186.  See Table 1B. 
 187.  See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 188.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 820 (“[W]hen treaties codify CIL, the President can, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, ratify these treaties and thereby convert the CIL codified within 
them into federal law.”); see also Bradley et al., supra note 35, at 878 (“[B]ecause ‘the federal lawmaking 
power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government,’ federal common law must be 
grounded in extant federal law: the Constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty.”). 
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Some have argued that treaties are a problematic source for CIL because 
they are “good evidence of what states want the law to be, but they are not 
necessarily good evidence of what the law is.”189 If anything, the increase in 
citations to treaties may reflect the modern emergence of opinio juris as a 
normative concept, one that focuses less on whether states actually consider 
themselves legally obligated to act and more on whether states believe such 
a legal obligation ought to exist.190 If this is the case, the increase in citations 
to treaties after Erie yields a new breed of “brooding omnipresence in the 
sky” that replaces the natural law principles of pre-Erie times with an “august 
corpus” of new, “aspirational” norms from which federal judges can “make” 
CIL.191 
According to our data, the rise of this new omnipresence appears short-
lived, as the citation rate for treaties dropped from fifty-five percent to thirty-
eight percent in the years following the Sosa decision.192 At the same time, 
citations to domestic statutes increased from thirty-nine percent to forty-five 
percent .193 Perhaps these simultaneous shifts signal a partial victory for 
revisionists, who not only advocate for positive incorporation of CIL through 
domestic federal statutes after Erie, but also anticipate less reliance on 
“verbal assent” sources (including treaties) after Sosa. Again, this victory is 
merely partial, for a revival of citations to traditional state practice did not 
emerge after Sosa. Furthermore, federal judges have not domesticated CIL 
through statutes or the U.S. Constitution so much as they have through an 
overwhelming reliance on U.S. case law. 
On that note, whenever we analyzed our data within the framework of 
the Erie debate, we continuously returned to the one finding that scholars 
involved in the debate did not anticipate—the prevalence of domestic cases 
as the primary source relied upon by the U.S. federal judiciary in determining 
CIL. After wading through the august corpus of Erie/CIL literature, we 
could not find a single scholar predicting a post-Erie increase in citations to 
 
 189.  Choi & Gulati, supra note 14, at 129 (“[T]he need for a treaty will often arise because of the 
absence of law, not when it is widespread and well established.”). 
 190.  See Roberts, supra note 11, at 757 (“State practice refers to general and consistent practice by 
states, while opinio juris means that the practice is followed out of a belief of legal obligation.”); see also 
Kadens & Young, supra note 1, at 908 (“More often nowadays, opinio [j]uris is found in normative 
statements—U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, aspirational treaty language, and the like. Such 
statements, which are generally divorced from actual state practice, are more like statements about the 
moral obligation or reasonableness of a principle than they are an account of why states do what they 
do.”). 
 191.  Along the same vein, see Szewczyk, supra note 146, at 1123 (explaining how the “lack of 
determinacy of the subset of international custom that is vague or disputed (‘emerging custom’)” 
embodies this “brooding omnipresence” concept). 
 192.  See Table 1B. 
 193.  See id. 
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domestic cases for CIL. In fact, the existing literature often cuts in the 
opposite direction.194 Our data appear to have uncovered something less 
international and more self-referential about the customary international law 
U.S. federal courts have applied. 
Do our findings expose a troubling reality for scholars of CIL? On one 
hand, perhaps not. After all, it is customary for the federal judiciary to cite 
primarily to federal precedent since it is mandatory authority in their 
jurisdictions. Perhaps by following themselves, U.S. federal judges are 
engaging in a pragmatic form of common law decision making—precisely 
what legal realists would predict. Indeed, this is what Curtis Bradley 
suggested in 2015 that courts are doing and should be doing with CIL.195 
On the other hand, haven’t both sides of the original Erie debate argued 
that CIL requires something extra before it can be applied as federal common 
law in U.S. courts? Dare we suggest that this “something extra” should be 
state practice and opinio juris? Without citing to sufficient evidence of both, 
judges risk validating Patrick Kelly’s critique of CIL as “lack[ing] authority 
as law, because such norms are not, in fact, based on the . . . general 
acceptance of the international community that a norm is obligatory.”196 
Moreover, even if it was widely agreed that CIL enjoys the status of federal 
common law, we should still expect judges to apply CIL as traditionally 
defined by the ICJ.197 
Perhaps the federal judiciary’s reliance on domestic precedent serves a 
useful purpose—namely, that of promoting efficiency and uniformity in U.S. 
interpretations of CIL. We suggested earlier that gathering sufficient 
evidence of state practice is a nearly impossible task.198 Rather than 
conducting such an empirical inquiry each time a question arises and poses 
an issue implicating CIL, it may be more practical for federal judges to cite 
 
 194.  See Koh, supra note 4, at 1853 (arguing that judges exercise less judicial discretion when 
adjudicating CIL); Neuman, supra note 43, at 376 (asserting that federal courts “exercise a limited role” 
when applying CIL because “they can apply only those norms that external evidence demonstrates 
embody genuine international legal obligations binding on the United States”). Like Koh, Neuman insists 
that federal judges do not just create CIL rules based solely on their independent judgment. See id. (“As 
legal realists, we know that judges have discretion at the margins in recognizing and applying these 
norms; but they do not exercise the innovating powers of State common law courts.”). 
 195.  See Bradley, supra note 176, at 34 (defending a “common law account [which] recognizes a 
significant element of judgment and creativity in determining the content of CIL”). But see Bradley & 
Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 816 (reflecting Bradley’s different view in 1997, which “question[ed] the 
modern position’s historical validity,” and argued that “its recent rise to orthodoxy has been accompanied 
by little critical scrutiny”). 
 196.  Kelly, supra note 10, at 452. 
 197.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1 (b), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 
(noting that courts “shall apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law”). 
 198.  See supra Part I. 
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precedent where international materials have been collected and analyzed to 
discern a “crystallized” CIL norm. From a practical standpoint, prior 
decisions are easily accessible to U.S. judges, much more so than the myriad 
international sources that judges (and their clerks) may not necessarily know 
exist. By citing domestic precedent, the federal judiciary is able to craft a 
consistent U.S. stance on CIL rules that contributes to a consistent body of 
CIL globally. 
Nevertheless, we ask once more— at what point does CIL become too 
domesticated to qualify as international law? To the possibility that judges 
cite one another for efficiency purposes, we have two responses: first, 
whoever makes that claim bears the burden of producing actual evidence of 
this practice before we can assume that it is in fact happening; secondly, even 
if we find it acceptable to delegate the “crystallizing” to a small subset of 
judges in this way, our original question still stands—what percentages of 
international consensus variables should they be citing to? Ironically, we 
suspect that the highly domestic nature of our courts’ CIL may resurrect the 
fears of some of Bradley and Goldsmith’s critics, namely those who decried 
the American exceptionalism and anti-internationalism that made up the 
“New Sovereigntist” movement.199 Still, if those fears do reappear, are they 
warranted? 
All of the foregoing questions really boil down to one: what is 
customary international law, really? Although we cannot presume to 
adequately answer this final question, we hope that this study breathes new 
life into this age-old inquiry. For now, we have suggested several ways in 
which these judicial practices affect the Erie/CIL debate specifically, but we 
will allow readers to decide whether these realities ought to concern scholars 
of CIL as a matter of principle. In making this decision, it may prove helpful 
to consider whether highly domesticated, self-referential methods of 
determining CIL detract from its legitimacy as law. 
Ultimately, it is our hope that the great Erie debaters will reconcile their 
theories with the realities of CIL determinations by the U.S. federal judiciary. 
In the process, we also hope they will venture beyond exploring CIL’s place 
as “part of our law” and revisit—in a more informed manner—fundamental 
questions relating to CIL’s status as law. 
 
 
 199.  See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 60 (“Sure to lose in the long run, New Sovereigntism also hurts 
America in the here and now.”); see Scoville, supra note 175, at 1899 (criticizing CIL as applied in ATS 
cases, and claiming that “contemporary CIL retains the under-inclusive and overwhelmingly occidental 
genealogy of the historical law of nations”). 
